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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This labor arbitration appeal presents the question 
whether the District Court erred in finding that it was the 
role of the court--and not an arbitrator--to determine 
whether the underlying dispute between the parties was 
subject to one particular arbitration procedure rather than 
another. We conclude that this issue--which of two 
arbitration procedures in a collective bargaining agreement 
applies to a particular labor dispute--is one of "procedural 
arbitrability," and therefore should be decided by an 
arbitrator and not a federal court. We therefore reverse. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The parties to this dispute are Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania 
("Bell") and a local and regional body of the 
Communications Workers of America (collectively "CWA"). 
Bell and the CWA, or their predecessors, have been parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") for more than 
half a century. The version of the CBA that is material to 
this appeal was modified and extended on August 6, 1995, 
with an effective ending date of August 8, 1998. Under the 
CBA, the parties have agreed to arbitrate most disputes 
under the contractual arbitration procedure (the "regular 
arbitration" procedure). However, under the CBA, some 
disputes that might arise are explicitly excluded from 
arbitration, while others may only be arbitrated under a 
special arbitration procedure (the "expedited arbitration" 
procedure). Finally, some disputes may be arbitrated under 
either arbitration procedure. 
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The dispute underlying the present appeal, which is not 
before us (and was not before the District Court), revolves 
around Bell's reorganization of certain of its administrative 
units. Following negotiations between the parties pursuant 
to the CBA's administrative-reorganization provisions, Bell 
and the CWA reached an impasse, and Bell implemented its 
proposed reorganization. The Union claimed that this 
reorganization violated the CBA in a number of respects, 
including alleged violations of the CBA provisions governing 
employee transfers, involuntary assignments, overtime, and 
definition of employee duties. It requested that these 
disputes be submitted to the regular arbitration procedure 
of the CBA. Bell refused, arguing that the administrative- 
reorganization provision of the CBA authorized the Union to 
use only the expedited arbitration procedure to resolve 
such disputes. 
 
Bell then sued in the District Court, alleging that the 
Union had violated the CBA by insisting on submitting the 
above dispute to regular arbitration, and seeking a 
declaratory judgment that such disputes could only be 
submitted to the expedited arbitration procedure.1 Upon 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
granted Bell's motion, holding that (1) the determination 
whether the parties' dispute must be submitted to the 
expedited arbitration procedure and not the regular 
procedure was a matter of "substantive arbitrability," and 
therefore for the court to decide; (2) Bell was not required 
to arbitrate its allegation that the Union had violated the 
CBA; and (3) the CBA provision in question required the 
Union to submit the underlying dispute to the expedited 
arbitration procedure and not the regular arbitration 
procedure. The Union filed a timely notice of appeal. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 301 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 185, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2201-2202, and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. 
 
2. While we review for clear error a district court's factual 
determination 
that a contractual dispute is arbitrable, see Lukens Steel Co. v. United 
Steelworkers, 989 F.2d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 1993), we exercise plenary 
review over the legal question presented here, i.e., whether a contractual 
dispute is one of substantive or procedural arbitrability. 
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II. The Collective Bargaining Agreement's Arbi tration 
       Provisions 
 
The CBA at issue here includes a number of provisions 
governing contract disputes between the parties. The 
grievance-and-arbitration provision of the CBA provides: 
 
       If, at any time, a controversy should arise between the 
       Union and the Company regarding the true intent and 
       meaning of any provision of this Agreement or 
       regarding any claim that either party has not 
       performed a commitment of this Agreement, the 
       controversy may be presented for review in accordance 
       with the [grievance provisions] of this Article. If the 
       controversy is processed under these Sections and is 
       not satisfactorily settled, the Union or the Company, by 
       written notice specifying the Section of the Agreement 
       alleged to be violated, may submit the question under 
       dispute to arbitration in accordance with the provisions 
       of Article 13 of this Agreement. 
 
CBA S 10.07. Article 13, in turn, provides that "[t]here shall 
be arbitrated only the matters specifically made subject to 
arbitration by the provisions of this Agreement," id. S 13.01, 
and that "[t]he procedure for arbitration is set forth in 
Exhibit B," id. S 13.02. 
 
Exhibit B provides, in relevant part: 
 
       The procedure to be followed in instituting and 
       conducting the arbitration of any matter subject to 
       arbitration under the provisions of Article 13, shall be 
       as follows, except that the tripartite board may be 
       eliminated and an agency other than the American 
       Arbitration Association may be substituted upon 
       mutual agreement of the parties. 
 
Id. S B1.01. The remaining parts of Article B1 contain the 
details of the procedure "to be followed in instituting and 
conducting the arbitration of any matter subject to 
arbitration under the provisions of Article 13," including the 
appointment of an arbitrator by each side and the selection 
of an impartial third arbitrator. 
 
Exhibit B also contains a procedure for "expedited 
arbitration": 
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       In lieu of the procedures specified in Section B1 of this 
       Agreement, any grievance involving the suspension of 
       an individual employee, [with certain exceptions not 
       here relevant,] shall be submitted to arbitration under 
       the expedited arbitration procedure hereinafter 
       provided within fifteen (15) calendar days after the 
       filing of a request for arbitration. In all other grievances 
       involving disciplinary action which are specifically 
       subject to arbitration under Article 11 of this 
       Agreement, both parties may, within fifteen (15) 
       calendar days after the filing of the request for 
       arbitration, elect to use the expedited arbitration 
       procedure hereinafter provided. The election shall be in 
       writing and, when signed by authorized representatives 
       of the parties, shall be irrevocable. If no such election 
       is made within the foregoing time period, the 
       arbitration procedure in Section B1 shall be followed. 
 
Id. S B2.01. 
 
The underlying dispute in this case is governed, inter 
alia, by Article 39 of the CBA. Under Article 39, Bell must 
follow certain procedures when a reorganization is 
contemplated, including consulting with the Union. If these 
consultations fail to result in a reorganization agreement, 
Bell may implement its own plan. Under the provision at 
the heart of this case, "[i]f management implements 
procedures without the agreement of the Union, the Union 
may submit to expedited arbitration the question whether 
the procedures implemented are in compliance with the 
standards and requirements listed in [section] 39.05." Id. 
S 39.07. 
 
III. Substantive and Procedural Arbitrability  
 
The ultimate question presented by Bell's initial 
complaint is whether Article 39 requires the Union to use 
the expedited arbitration procedure to resolve the disputes 
surrounding Bell's administrative reorganization. However, 
a threshold question--one that is dispositive of this appeal 
--is interposed, for when faced with a dispute involving 
labor arbitration, a federal court must first determine 
whether resolution of the disagreement is for the court or 
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for an arbitrator to undertake. In this case, Bell argued and 
the District Court found that the issue of which arbitration 
procedure applied to the parties' reorganization dispute was 
a matter properly for the court, and not an arbitrator, to 
decide. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
 
A. 
 
Disputes surrounding arbitration have often been divided 
into the categories of "substantive arbitrability" and 
"procedural arbitrability." Substantive arbitrability refers to 
the question whether a particular dispute is subject to the 
parties' contractual arbitration provision(s). Absent a clear 
expression to the contrary in the parties' contract, 
substantive arbitrability determinations are to be made by 
a court and not an arbitrator. Our national labor policy 
evinces a strong preference for peaceful, self-resolution of 
labor-management disputes, as explained in the famous 
"Steelworkers' Trilogy."3 However, if an arbitrator were to 
decide the substantive arbitrability issue, a party objecting 
to having the underlying dispute submitted to arbitration 
on the ground that it did not consent to do so would 
already have its alleged intent (to not submit the dispute to 
arbitration) ignored. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine 
Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974) ("The law compels a 
party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has 
contracted to do so."); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 
376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) ("The duty to arbitrate being of 
contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration 
cannot precede judicial determination that the collective 
bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty."). 
Therefore, parties may be sent to arbitration only after the 
court so directing them is satisfied that this was their 
intent and that both parties consented to do so in their 
contractual agreement. 
 
Once this threshold determination has been made by the 
court, i.e., once the court has discerned the parties' intent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 598-99 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. 
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960). 
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to submit their underlying dispute to arbitration, any 
further matters surrounding the dispute are to be 
submitted to the arbitration procedure. See Chauffeurs, 
Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 765 v. Stroehmann 
Bros. Co., 625 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The 
court's role . . . [is] to determine whether the underlying 
subject matter of the grievance was arbitrable. Once that 
determination has been made the entire dispute must be 
resolved by the arbitrator." (citation omitted)). These other 
matters are labeled, perhaps underinclusively, procedural 
arbitrability issues, and are resolved as part of the 
arbitration procedure to which the parties have committed 
themselves, as a number of cases, arising in somewhat 
different scenarios but nonetheless instructive here, 
demonstrate. We set them forth in the margin.4 
 
In its leading procedural arbitrability case, the Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Flair 
Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1972) ("[O]nce a court finds that, 
as 
here, the parties are subject to an agreement to arbitrate, and that 
agreement extends to `any difference' between them, then a claim that 
particular grievances are barred by laches is an arbitrable question 
under the agreement."); Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. 
Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685, 696 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
"determination of the parameters and scope" of an arbitrator's award, 
which involved "an analysis of the interplay" between various contract 
provisions, was a matter for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts); 
Whittle v. Local 641, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 56 F.3d 487, 490 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("Timeliness is a procedural issue, and in an arbitration 
proceeding, procedural issues are for the arbitrator to decide."); Troy 
Chem. Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 127-28 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("Once the court decided that the discharges were subject to 
arbitration, it should have held that the dispute was arbitrable and that 
matters relating to compliance with the grievance procedure or a waiver 
were matters for the arbitrator."); Stroehmann Bros. Co., 625 F.2d at 
1093 ("[T]he significance of a default in literal compliance with a 
contractual procedural requirement calls for a determination of the 
intention of the parties to the contract. Such a determination . . ., 
under 
the governing case law, [is a matter] for the arbitrator."); Controlled 
Sanitation Corp. v. District 128, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 524 F.2d 1324, 1331 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that company's 
contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular 
dispute was a matter for the arbitrator, and not the court, to decide). 
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Court explained why procedural arbitrability issues are best 
left to the arbitrator: 
 
        Doubt whether grievance procedures or some part of 
       them apply to a particular dispute, whether such 
       procedures have been followed or excused, or whether 
       the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to 
       arbitrate cannot ordinarily be answered without 
       consideration of the merits of the dispute which is 
       presented for arbitration. 
 
John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 557. Therefore, procedural 
issues are to be resolved by the arbitrator, once (and only 
after) the court determines that the underlying dispute is 
one the parties have agreed to submit to the arbitrator. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court in this case believed that the threshold 
question before it was "whether the subject matter of the 
instant dispute is covered and/or excluded from regular 
arbitration under Sections 10.07 and B1." Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. 
v. Communications Workers, Local 13000, No. CIV.A.97- 
4179, 1998 WL 84017, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1998) 
(emphasis added). Put another way, the court found that 
"the issue presented is whether the Company agreed to 
arbitrate Article 39 disputes through Section B1 regular 
arbitration--a question of substantive arbitrability." Id. 
(emphasis added). However, the actual threshold question 
before us--and given our resolution of this issue, the only 
one before us--is whether Bell agreed to arbitrate Article 39 
disputes. This is both a question of substantive arbitrability 
and, given Bell's concession that the reorganization 
disputes are subject to some arbitration procedure, a 
foregone conclusion. Bell does not contend that it did not 
agree to arbitrate disputes arising from its administrative 
reorganizations. Rather, it disagrees with the Union's claim 
that these disputes are subject to a particular arbitration 
procedure. This disagreement, however, is not one of 
substantive arbitrability. 
 
The fundamental error of the District Court was its 
expansion of the basic substantive arbitrability question 
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("whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate"5) into 
a much broader inquiry, one that falls outside of the 
substantive arbitrability domain ("whether the particular 
arbitration clause covers the subject matter of the 
particular dispute between the parties"6). Such an 
expansion is unwarranted. It is inconsistent with this 
Court's and the Supreme Court's precedents in this area 
and it is not dictated by the policy concerns behind the 
substantive arbitrability doctrine.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
6. Bell Atl.-Pa., 1998 WL 84017, at *10. 
 
7. In support of its position, Bell cites two cases ostensibly involving 
multiple arbitration procedures like those that exist here. The first, 
Adams v. Gould, Inc., 687 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1982), is completely 
inapposite. The "sole question" in that interlocutory appeal was "whether 
certain individual employees . . . [were] bound by the results of an 
arbitration between their employer and their union and thereby barred 
from bringing their complaint in federal court." Id. at 28. In Adams, the 
union had arbitrated a grievance under one of two arbitration clauses, 
and an arbitration award was eventually issued. Individual employees 
then sought to litigate in federal court the same dispute that was the 
subject of the arbitration. We reversed the district court's denial of 
summary judgment on behalf of the employer, concluding that the 
employees were bound by the results of the arbitration. See id. at 33. 
One of the grounds that the individual employees urged in support of 
their argument that they were not bound by the arbitration award was 
that the parties (i.e., the employer and union) had used the incorrect 
arbitration procedure. See id. at 32. There is no indication that the 
parties actually discussed this issue during the arbitration or that the 
arbitrator adjudicated the issue. Rather, it arose only in the collateral 
context of our examining the employees' claim that they were not bound 
by the already-issued arbitration award. Not surprisingly, given that no 
alternative forum existed for resolving this issue, we reached (and 
rejected) it. We were in no way faced squarely with the issue presented 
here: must the court, rather than an arbitrator, determine which is the 
appropriate arbitration procedure when the parties agree that their 
dispute will be arbitrated at some future date? 
 
The other case relied on by Bell comes from the Seventh Circuit. See 
Torrington Co. v. Local Union 590, Int'l Union of Auto. Workers, 803 F.2d 
927 (7th Cir. 1986). Although the court in Torrington decided which of 
two arbitration provisions applied to the parties' underlying dispute, 
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The District Court invoked these policy concerns when it 
found that submitting to an arbitrator the issue of which 
arbitration provision applies to the parties' dispute "would 
possibly deter other Unions and employe[rs] from entering 
into such agreements to arbitrate." Bell Atl.-Pa., 1998 WL 
84017, at *10 n.8. The District Court's concern is simply 
misplaced: Bell is bound to arbitrate the underlying dispute 
no matter what the court decides. Allowing an arbitrator to 
determine which procedure will be used does not force Bell 
to arbitrate any disputes that it believed it was withholding 
from arbitration--unlike the situation when the basic 
determination of whether or not an underlying dispute is 
arbitrable is sent to an arbitrator. 
 
What Bell asks us to do here is to greatly expand the 
class of substantive arbitrability cases. In its view, the 
disagreement between the parties--whether a dispute will 
be resolved through arbitration procedure A or arbitration 
procedure B--is no different from the traditional 
substantive arbitrability question--whether a dispute will 
be resolved through an arbitration procedure or through 
some other means, such as litigation, a strike, or a lockout. 
This argument, however, has no logical limits. If the present 
case involves substantive arbitrability, why not also a case 
asking whether a dispute is to be resolved through an 
arbitration procedure or an unexhausted grievance 
procedure? See John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 556-57 
(employer's argument that union must first submit dispute 
to grievance procedure was a matter for the arbitrator to 
decide). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
neither party argued that this was an issue for the arbitrator and not for 
the court to decide. Further, the union originally sought to litigate in 
court the underlying dispute, arguing that none of the arbitration 
provisions applied, presenting the court with a clear substantive 
arbitrability problem. Finally, the court found that the arbitration 
procedure that the union (subsequently) argued should be used clearly 
and expressly did not apply to the underlying dispute. See id. at 931. 
This distinguishes that provision from the regular arbitration provision 
in the present case. Cf. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 
513 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the "plain language" of the parties' 
contract, which limited the cases "eligible for submission to 
arbitration," 
rendered the underlying dispute not arbitrable). 
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We find the present case functionally indistinguishable 
from (and controlled by) those cases in which the parties 
agree that an underlying dispute is arbitrable, but disagree 
about the effect of laches, waiver, exhaustion of pre- 
arbitration steps, limitations periods, or other "procedural" 
issues. See supra note 4. Bell and its Union agree that 
disputes over the reorganization of administrative groups 
may be resolved through arbitration; they simply disagree 
on the procedures to be followed. The Union has asked that 
both of these issues--the reorganization dispute and the 
procedure to be followed--be submitted to an arbitrator, 
and we hold that this is the proper course for the parties. 
See John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 558 (holding that the 
court must send the parties to arbitration in "cases in 
which arbitrability of the subject matter is unquestioned 
but a dispute arises over the procedures to be followed").8 
 
The District Court's judgment will be reversed and this 
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because we hold that the District Court erred in finding that the 
question of which arbitration procedure should be followed was an issue 
for the court, and not an arbitrator, to decide, we do not reach the other 
issues decided by the District Court. This includes its holding that Bell 
was not required to submit its allegation that the Union violated the CBA 
to an arbitrator, and the District Court's ultimate determination 
regarding the meaning of section 39.07 of the CBA. The first of these 
issues is mooted by our resolution of this appeal, while the second issue, 
as we have held above, is not for us (or the District Court), but for the 
arbitrator to decide. 
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